Antisemitism—but not criticism of Israel—associated with support for political violence

A new study published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism provides evidence that antisemitic attitudes, rather than anti-Israel sentiment alone, are linked to support for political violence in the United States. The findings suggest that while criticism of Israel can motivate legal activism, it is antisemitic prejudice that tends to predict a willingness to support illegal or violent political actions and general aggression.

The research was led by Sophia Moskalenko of Georgia State University, along with co-authors Tomislav Pavlović and Mia Bloom. The team aimed to address a gap in the literature by empirically distinguishing between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel, especially in how they relate to political radicalization and violence.

The study was motivated by a recent surge in global protests and violence following the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli military actions in Gaza. While antisemitic incidents have spiked in this context, public discourse and some research often conflate anti-Israel sentiment with antisemitism. Moskalenko and her colleagues sought to clarify whether these two forms of animosity are behaviorally distinct—particularly in terms of support for activism versus support for violence.

The study used a sample of 542 U.S. adults recruited online through Prolific. Participants were surveyed on their attitudes toward Jews and Israel, as well as their willingness to engage in political activism, violent or illegal political actions, and general aggression.

The authors used an established antisemitism scale that included items assessing both anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment as separate dimensions. For example, one item measured belief that “Jewish people chase money more than others,” while another measured agreement with the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews.”

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Participants also responded to the Activism-Radicalism Intention Scale, which asks about support for legal political activity (such as joining protests) and for more extreme actions (such as using violence or supporting groups that break the law). General aggression was assessed with items like “If somebody hits me, I hit back.” Finally, participants were asked about their support for specific protest tactics related to Israel’s actions in Gaza, including peaceful encampments, disruptive actions like blocking traffic, and violent acts against police or Jewish individuals.

Using a statistical method called latent profile analysis, the researchers identified five distinct profiles based on the participants’ responses:

1. Pro-Jew and pro-Israel (proJI): The largest group (40 percent) held positive views of both Jews and Israel.
2. Pro-Jew but anti-Israel (proJ–antiI): This group (18 percent) expressed support for Jews but strong criticism of Israel.
3. Weak anti-Jew and anti-Israel (weak-antiJI): This segment (15 percent) had moderately negative views of both Jews and Israel.
4. Moderate or ambivalent (moderateJI): A quarter of participants showed neither strong support nor strong dislike toward Jews or Israel.
5. Strong anti-Jew and anti-Israel (strong-antiJI): The smallest group (2 percent) endorsed strongly negative views of both.

These profiles were then compared across measures of activism, radicalism, aggression, and support for protest tactics.

The proJ–antiI group stood out for its high support for legal activism. Members of this group were especially likely to endorse peaceful or disruptive forms of protest, such as encampments and blocking traffic, but they did not show elevated support for violence—especially not violence targeting Jewish individuals. Their general aggression scores were also low.

By contrast, the weak-antiJI and strong-antiJI profiles showed much higher levels of radicalism and aggression. These individuals were more likely to endorse violent actions against both police and Jews in protest scenarios. While they were not the most active in terms of legal political engagement, their support for illegal or violent actions was significantly higher than that of the other groups.

The moderateJI and proJI profiles tended to reject both activism and radicalism. These participants were less politically engaged overall and scored low on aggression.

Statistical comparisons showed that antisemitic attitudes—not just criticism of Israel—were the strongest predictors of support for violence. The weak-antiJI group, despite holding only moderate anti-Jewish views, had the highest scores for general aggression. The proJ–antiI group, by contrast, was high in activism but no more supportive of violence than the tolerant proJI group.

When looking specifically at support for violence against Jewish individuals, the difference was even more striking. Both antisemitic profiles showed elevated support for such violence, while the proJ–antiI group did not. Their average score on this measure was nearly identical to that of the proJI group. In other words, only when antisemitic sentiment was present did participants endorse violent actions against Jewish targets.

The findings support the idea that antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment represent distinct ideological drivers of political behavior. The researchers argue that antisemitism operates through what they call the “hate” mechanism, where outgroup hostility leads directly to support for violence. Anti-Israel sentiment, on the other hand, appears to function more through the “group grievance” mechanism—fueling activism without necessarily dehumanizing the outgroup.

In practical terms, this means that not all political dissent is equal in its psychological underpinnings or behavioral implications. The authors emphasize that many individuals who protest Israeli policies do so out of perceived injustice, not because of hostility toward Jews. Their activism reflects political concern, not racial or religious hatred.

As with all research, there are limitations. The sample, though diverse, may not fully represent the U.S. population. It also relied on self-reported attitudes and hypothetical scenarios, which may not reflect actual behavior in real-world contexts. The researchers also did not collect information about participants’ religious identities, which could be relevant when interpreting attitudes toward Jews or Israel.

Another limitation is that the study was cross-sectional. Future research could use longitudinal methods to explore how individuals shift between attitudinal profiles over time, especially in response to major geopolitical events.

The authors also suggest that further research should include qualitative approaches, such as interviews or focus groups, to better understand the motivations behind these attitudes. They also propose extending the analysis to other countries to examine whether similar attitudinal profiles emerge in different cultural and political contexts.

The study, “Attitudes Toward Jews and Israel: Profiles Linked to Political Violence in the United States,” was authored by Sophia Moskalenko, Tomislav Pavlović, and Mia Bloom.