Despite political tensions, belief in an impending U.S. civil war remains low

A new study has found that most Americans do not expect a civil war to occur in the near future, and even fewer believe such a conflict is necessary. Among those who do foresee participating in such violence, many say they could be persuaded not to take part if encouraged by family, friends, or trusted leaders. These findings come from a large, nationally representative survey conducted in mid-2024 and published in the journal Injury Epidemiology.

The study is part of an ongoing project led by Garen J. Wintemute at the University of California, Davis, which has tracked public attitudes about political violence in the United States since 2022. Previous waves of the survey showed that belief in the likelihood or need for civil war had declined between 2022 and 2023. With political polarization increasing and the 2024 elections approaching, researchers expected to see a rise in these beliefs. But the latest data suggest that public sentiment on this issue has remained relatively stable.

To explore these trends, researchers collected responses from over 8,000 U.S. adults who had completed earlier waves of the survey in 2022 and 2023. Participants were members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, a widely used online survey panel recruited through address-based sampling to reflect the U.S. population. The 2024 survey was conducted between May 23 and June 14, shortly before and after the announcement of Donald Trump’s felony convictions, allowing researchers to examine whether this high-profile legal development influenced public views.

Participants were asked whether they agreed with statements such as “In the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States” and “The United States needs a civil war to set things right.” Only 6.5% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was likely in the near future, and just 3.6% agreed that such a conflict was needed. These percentages were almost identical to those recorded in the 2023 survey.

The survey also asked respondents how they would behave if a large-scale conflict did occur. Nearly half said they would remain in the U.S. but not participate, and 12.4% said they would be likely to leave the country. A large majority—84.2%—said it was unlikely they would take part in combat. Only 3.7% considered it very or extremely likely that they would do so, and a similar share said they would be likely to kill a combatant.

Among this small group of people who expected to engage in violence, researchers found a notable willingness to reconsider. Nearly 45% said they would no longer view combat as likely if urged by family members. Between 23% and 31% said they might change their minds if encouraged by friends, religious leaders, elected officials, or the media. These findings point to possible opportunities for preventing political violence by influencing those at risk through personal relationships and trusted voices.

To better understand who held these beliefs, the researchers examined several demographic and ideological factors. Individuals who identified as “strong Republicans,” those who identified as “MAGA Republicans,” and those who described their political views as “extreme conservative” consistently showed higher levels of these beliefs compared to their counterparts.

For these groups, the prevalence of expecting a civil war, believing a war was necessary, and predicting they would serve as a combatant was notably higher than the national average. For instance, among Republicans who identify with the MAGA movement, 10.2% strongly or very strongly agreed that a civil war is coming, and 7.8% believed a war is needed—rates that are roughly double and triple, respectively, the figures for non-MAGA, non-Republicans (5.5% and 2.4%).

The researchers also explored how these views were associated with more fundamental belief systems, specifically authoritarianism and racist beliefs. Participants were asked to respond to statements designed to measure support for authoritarian principles, such as the idea that the country needs a strong leader who can break the rules. They were also asked about their agreement with a series of racist statements.

The analysis showed a strong association: respondents who expressed strong agreement with either authoritarian or racist beliefs were also significantly more likely to expect a civil war, to believe a civil war was needed, and to see themselves as likely combatants in such a conflict.

However, the most pronounced and dramatic differences were found among the small sliver of respondents who expressed strong approval of specific extremist right-wing organizations and social movements. The survey explicitly asked participants about their approval of groups like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters, as well as movements such as QAnon.

Among the individuals who strongly approved of these groups and movements, the belief in an impending and necessary civil war was not a fringe opinion but a majority view. The study reported that more than half of these respondents (55.7%) expected a civil war in the next few years. This stands in stark contrast to the 6.5% found in the general population. Similarly, a majority of this group (50.8%) believed that the United States needs a civil war to set things right, a belief held by only 3.6% of the overall sample.

Most strikingly, the willingness to personally engage in violence was exceptionally high in this subgroup. A staggering 39% of those who approved of these extremist movements thought it was very or extremely likely that they would participate as a combatant in a civil war. This figure is more than ten times higher than the 3.7% likelihood reported by the average respondent. These findings illustrate that while belief in and willingness to fight in a civil war are rare across the nation as a whole, these attitudes are highly concentrated within specific, ideologically-defined subsets of the population.

Firearm ownership was also associated with greater support for political violence, particularly among those who owned assault-style rifles, had purchased firearms recently, or carried them in public frequently. However, differences between firearm owners and non-owners were generally modest.

People who said they were willing to damage property, threaten others, or commit acts of violence for political purposes were more likely to believe civil war was coming and to expect to participate. The same was true for those who thought it likely they would use a firearm in politically motivated violence.

Despite these risk factors, the overall picture painted by the study was one of limited support for large-scale political conflict. Most Americans did not see civil war as likely or necessary, and very few expected to take part. Even among those who did, a significant portion showed openness to change, especially if their loved ones or trusted figures spoke out against violence.

These results suggest that prevention strategies could focus on encouraging people to express their opposition to political violence, especially within families and communities. Public messages from elected officials, religious leaders, and respected media sources might also have an impact. The researchers argue that such efforts could help weaken the link between political polarization and violent behavior, even if it is difficult to change the underlying beliefs that contribute to division.

There are a few caveats to consider. The study captures views from only one point in time and is based on self-reported attitudes, which may not always predict real-world behavior. While the sample was designed to represent the general population, differences between those who responded and those who did not could affect the results.

The study, “Public opinion on civil war in the USA as of mid-2024: findings from a nationally representative survey,” was authored by Garen J. Wintemute, Yueju Li, Mona A. Wright, Andrew Crawford, and Elizabeth A. Tomsich.