People with higher cognitive ability tend to endorse moral values less strongly across the board, according to new research published in the journal Intelligence. The pattern held across two independent studies and did not differ by gender. These findings challenge popular assumptions that smarter people hold stronger or more “enlightened” moral values.
While it’s often assumed that smarter people are more ethical or morally developed, past research has produced conflicting results. Some studies have linked higher intelligence to greater support for liberal values like compassion and fairness, while others have found that smarter individuals are less likely to endorse moral principles rooted in loyalty, tradition, or purity. In short, the relationship between intelligence and moral values was unclear. The present study aimed to clarify that relationship by using an improved measure of moral foundations and a well-established test of cognitive ability.
The study focused on a theory known as Moral Foundations Theory, which proposes that people’s moral judgments are guided by a set of six intuitive “foundations.” These include two “individualizing” foundations—care and equality—that focus on protecting individuals from harm and promoting fairness.
The other four—proportionality, loyalty, authority, and purity—are called “binding” foundations because they support social cohesion, hierarchy, and shared values. People differ in how strongly they endorse each of these foundations. For example, liberals tend to score higher on individualizing foundations, while conservatives score higher on all six, especially the binding ones. The theory suggests these differences reflect deep-seated moral intuitions rather than deliberate reasoning.
To test whether intelligence is linked to these moral intuitions, the researchers conducted two studies. In the first, they recruited 802 participants from the United Kingdom through an online platform. Participants first completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2, a revised version of a standard tool for measuring the six moral foundations. About two weeks later, 463 of these participants completed a set of cognitive tests measuring verbal reasoning, numerical pattern recognition, and abstract reasoning. These tests assessed both specific abilities and general intelligence.
The second study involved a new and larger group of 857 adults, also from the United Kingdom. Unlike the first study, this group completed both the moral and cognitive tests in the same session. The second study was preregistered, meaning the researchers publicly stated their hypotheses in advance to reduce bias. The same materials and procedures were used as in the first study, ensuring consistency.
In both studies, the researchers used statistical models to examine the relationship between intelligence and moral foundations. They tested four competing hypotheses. One predicted no relationship at all. Another proposed that intelligence would strengthen all moral foundations. A third suggested that smarter people would favor individualizing foundations but reject binding ones. The final hypothesis, called the Morality Suppression Model, predicted that intelligence would be negatively related to all moral foundations.
The results supported the Morality Suppression Model. In both studies, higher intelligence was linked to weaker endorsement of every moral foundation. People with higher scores on verbal, numerical, and abstract reasoning tests rated care, equality, proportionality, loyalty, authority, and purity as less important to their moral identity.
The associations were modest in size but statistically significant, and the patterns were nearly identical in both samples. In addition, a specific link was found between verbal intelligence and lower endorsement of the purity foundation, which includes beliefs about bodily sanctity and traditional moral boundaries.
The researchers also checked whether these relationships differed between men and women. While average scores on moral foundations did differ by gender, the connections between intelligence and moral values did not. The same pattern of negative associations held for both sexes.
These findings add weight to the idea that higher cognitive ability may weaken people’s reliance on intuitive moral judgments. People with stronger reasoning skills might be less likely to accept moral values at face value and more inclined to question or reinterpret them. This fits with previous research suggesting that analytic thinking can override gut-level moral reactions. However, it runs counter to the belief that intelligent people are more morally developed or compassionate. Instead, the results suggest that smart people may be more detached from moral intuitions altogether.
One possible explanation is that analytic thinking, which is associated with higher cognitive ability, tends to reduce emotional engagement with moral issues. Moral intuitions often depend on quick, emotional reactions to right and wrong, while analytical thinking involves deliberate, emotion-neutral reasoning. If intelligence promotes more of the latter, it could dampen the strength of moral convictions across all domains, not just those associated with political conservatism.
The researchers also offered a more speculative idea. They noted that verbal intelligence was especially linked to lower endorsement of purity values, which include beliefs about bodily sanctity and moral cleanliness. People high in verbal ability may be more likely to use language and reasoning to challenge or reinterpret these traditional values, seeing them as outdated or unnecessary. This could reflect a broader pattern in which smart people use their reasoning skills to downplay moral norms that constrain behavior.
Although the findings were consistent across two large samples, the study has some limitations. First, the data cannot determine whether intelligence causes weaker moral foundations (or vice versa). For example, it’s possible that people who reject strong moral intuitions are drawn to intellectual pursuits that reward abstract thinking.
Second, all moral values were measured using self-report questionnaires. Including other methods, such as behavioral tasks or peer reports, could strengthen future studies. Third, the study focused on a Western, English-speaking population. More research is needed to see whether the same patterns hold in other cultural settings.
The study, “Higher cognitive ability linked to weaker moral foundations in UK adults,” was authored by Michael Zakharin and Timothy C. Bates.