Two simple cognitive tendencies emerge as surprisingly powerful predictors of belief in pseudoscience

People who are more likely to endorse pseudoscientific beliefs tend to report experiencing meaningful coincidences more often and are also more likely to misrepresent random events as non-random. These findings, published in Applied Cognitive Psychology, suggest that belief in pseudoscience may stem from cognitive tendencies related to how people interpret everyday events and assess patterns.

Previous research had already found that people who believe in paranormal phenomena tend to experience more meaningful coincidences and show a strong tendency to avoid repeating patterns when simulating random events. These findings were thought to reflect a misunderstanding of how randomness works or a broader tendency to find meaning where none exists.

However, paranormal beliefs often involve supernatural explanations. Pseudoscientific beliefs, such as the idea that homeopathy is an effective medical treatment, may not rely on supernatural elements but still contradict established scientific evidence. The new study asked whether similar cognitive tendencies—such as seeing causality in random events or misunderstanding randomness—are also linked to pseudoscientific beliefs.

“We are interested in how biases in cognitive processing might make some individuals more prone to endorse beliefs not supported by adequate empiric evidence. I had read some exciting work linking biases in the interpretation of chance with paranormal beliefs, and I thought it could be interesting to try to extend those findings to the field of pseudoscience,” said study author Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro, a professor at the University of Barcelona.

The study involved 108 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Barcelona, with an average age of just over 22 years. Participants completed several tasks and questionnaires measuring their endorsement of pseudoscientific ideas, their personal experiences of coincidences, and their ability to simulate randomness.

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To measure pseudoscientific beliefs, participants rated their agreement with 20 statements reflecting popular but scientifically unsupported claims, such as beliefs about alternative medicine or astrology. Higher average scores indicated stronger endorsement of pseudoscience.

To assess perceptions of coincidences, the researchers used a questionnaire asking how often participants experienced “curious or meaningful” coincidences. These included examples such as thinking of someone and then unexpectedly seeing them. The participants also indicated what they believed caused these coincidences, choosing from options like pure chance, destiny, intuition, or extra-sensory perception. Participants could select more than one explanation.

Participants then completed two tasks designed to measure how they represent randomness. In one task, they viewed pairs of images showing either the head or tail of a coin and were instructed to randomly choose one to simulate a real coin toss. In the second task, they were shown images of a die’s six sides and asked to select one per trial, again attempting to mimic real dice rolls.

For both tasks, the researchers tracked how often participants repeated the same result in consecutive selections. A higher tendency to avoid repetition than expected by chance suggested a bias in how participants understood randomness.

The results showed that participants who more strongly endorsed pseudoscientific beliefs tended to report a higher frequency of meaningful coincidences in their lives. They were also more likely to attribute these coincidences to non-random causes, such as destiny or a universal connection, rather than to chance. Among the explanations offered for coincidences, “pure chance” was the most commonly endorsed, but those who selected this option tended to score lower on the pseudoscience measure.

Participants also displayed a general bias toward avoiding repetition when simulating randomness, selecting fewer repeated outcomes than chance would predict. This repetition avoidance was particularly evident in the coin toss task. Importantly, those who more strongly endorsed pseudoscientific beliefs were also more likely to show this bias, especially in the coin task. This suggested a link between belief in pseudoscience and a distorted sense of what a random sequence should look like.

When the researchers looked at all the variables together, they found that two factors independently predicted higher endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs. The first was how often participants explained coincidences with non-chance causes. The second was how strongly they avoided repetition in the coin task. These two cognitive tendencies—seeking causal explanations for coincidences and misunderstanding randomness—each appeared to contribute separately to belief in pseudoscience.

“We have found both a lower threshold for causally connecting events and biased representation of randomness independently predicted pseudoscientific belief endorsement, but the former had the clearest effect, specially in the case of the tendency to attribute non-chance explanations to coincidences between events,” Rodríguez-Ferreiro told PsyPost.

“Having said that, I was most surprised by the association with chance representation because I think that the link with pseudoscience endorsement is not that obvious. I find it very amusing that how we perform in relatively low-level tasks apparently disconnected from reality, such as replicating the tossing of a coin, is related with daily-life behaviors.”

The study was based on correlational data, which means it cannot determine whether these cognitive tendencies cause belief in pseudoscience or are merely associated with it. The researchers emphasized that their findings should not be taken as proof of a direct causal relationship. It is also possible that a third variable influences both the tendency to see patterns and belief in pseudoscientific ideas.

The study sample was also limited to psychology students in a Western European context. Beliefs in pseudoscience and the cognitive styles that support them may vary by culture. The findings may not apply to broader or more diverse populations.

The researchers suggest that future studies could test these findings in other cultural settings and use experimental methods to see whether changes in how people interpret randomness or coincidences can actually influence their belief in pseudoscientific ideas. They also hope to refine their tools for measuring coincidence interpretation by better integrating the reporting and explanation of such events.

“We would like to continue this research line designing a paradigm that could allow us to experimentally test whether perceived randomness influences causal inference,” Rodríguez-Ferreiro said.

While the research does not prove that these cognitive tendencies cause belief in pseudoscience, it does suggest they play a meaningful role. In the future, educational interventions aimed at improving people’s understanding of probability and the role of chance in everyday life might help reduce susceptibility to such beliefs.

“I think the take-home message is that the way we process information, in this case, how we understand coincidences between events, can lead us to false beliefs, so it is important to be cautious when interpreting the world around us,” Rodríguez-Ferreiro said.

The study, “Random Sequences, Experienced Coincidences, and Pseudoscientific Beliefs,” was authored by Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro, Nia Pangani, and Itxaso Barberia.