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A new study published in Political Research Quarterly sheds light on a longstanding puzzle in American politics: why voters often express strong support for government programs but hesitate when those programs come with visible costs. The findings indicate that Americans broadly support redistributive economic policies—but only when the costs are hidden or shifted to a small, wealthy minority. Support drops significantly when the burden of paying for these policies becomes more visible or widely shared.
Most prior surveys have asked people if they support increased government spending or if they favor higher taxes. But these questions are usually asked in isolation, without linking the benefits of a program to the costs of funding it. In real-world policymaking, however, spending decisions almost always involve trade-offs. Yale University political scientist Sam Zacher wanted to understand how Americans respond when those trade-offs are made explicit—when a policy benefit is directly tied to who would pay for it.
To do this, Zacher designed a survey that went beyond standard public opinion polls. The survey, fielded in late 2022 and early 2023, included 1,201 participants, with an intentional oversample of high-income respondents. About 382 of the participants had household incomes above $200,000. The survey was designed to measure support for a wide range of economic policy proposals, both in isolation and when paired with specific tax increases. Participants were asked to rate their support on a scale from 0 to 100, with labels indicating levels of support or opposition.
Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of two groups of policy “benefits,” such as increased funding for K–12 education, public pre-kindergarten, housing, health care, and renewable energy. Some proposals were more moderate (like raising the minimum wage to $11), while others were more ambitious (like transitioning to single-payer health care). All respondents saw the same set of “cost” options: five types of tax increases, including higher income taxes on those earning over $200,000 or $1 million, increased capital gains taxes, and an across-the-board tax increase on all incomes. Each policy benefit was also paired with a specific tax cost, forming a “bundle.” For example, one bundled proposal asked whether participants supported raising taxes on households earning over $1 million to fund public K–12 schools.
Zacher’s findings reveal just how sensitive Americans are to these policy trade-offs. Across the board, support for policy benefits was much higher when the cost was not mentioned. But when a tax increase was included—especially one affecting a broad swath of the public—support fell sharply. For example, a majority of Americans expressed support for public pre-kindergarten programs when asked in isolation. But when the proposal required raising taxes on all income levels, support dropped by nearly 30 percentage points.
The public was most supportive of redistributive policy bundles that placed the financial burden on the very wealthy. Proposals that paired tax hikes on incomes above $1 million with increased spending on popular services like renewable energy or public education consistently received majority or even supermajority support. On the other hand, proposals that required tax increases on all income levels—regardless of the benefit—never crossed the 50% support threshold.
Interestingly, support for raising taxes on the wealthy was sometimes even higher than support for the policy bundle itself. This suggests that while Americans may support “soaking the rich,” they can become more skeptical when the tax increase is linked to a particular government program. This effect may reflect general hesitation about complex policy changes or a lack of trust in government implementation.
Zacher also found that Americans’ preferences are shaped not just by their overall ideology or partisan identity, but also by their economic self-interest. Affluent respondents were much more sensitive to the potential costs of redistribution. When a policy proposal would impose direct tax increases on high-income households, support among affluent participants dropped significantly, even when the benefit was widely popular.
This pattern held even within political parties. Among Republicans, the gap between low-income and high-income voters was especially large. Wealthier Republicans were far more likely to oppose redistributive policy bundles than their less affluent counterparts. Among Democrats, the divisions were smaller but still present, especially when policy bundles included progressive tax increases.
The study also explored whether political donors—who often have outsize influence in the policy process—differed in their preferences. Among Democrats, donors and non-donors held similar views overall, though there were some differences on specific policies. For Republicans, donor preferences appeared more moderate than expected, though the small sample size made it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
But as with any study, there are limitations to consider. Zacher’s survey included a specific set of policy combinations, meaning that not all possible trade-offs were tested. The study also focused primarily on economic policies and did not explore issues like immigration or social policy, which can also have redistributive effects. Additionally, because the survey was conducted online, it may have excluded some populations who are less likely to participate in web-based surveys.
The study, “What Forms of Redistribution Do Americans Want? Understanding Preferences for Policy Benefit-Cost Tradeoffs,” was published online on June 14, 2024.
