New research highlights spite as a motivator of conspiracy theory beliefs

A new series of studies published in the Journal of Social Issues suggests that spite—a desire to harm others even at one’s own expense—may help explain why some people are drawn to conspiracy theories. The research, conducted by psychologists at Staffordshire University and the University of Birmingham, found that feelings of competitive disadvantage can trigger a spiteful mindset, which in turn makes people more receptive to conspiracy theories, especially those that involve science denial.

Across three pre-registered studies involving representative samples of adults in the United Kingdom, the researchers found that well-known psychological motives—such as feeling uncertain, powerless, or socially undervalued—were all associated with increased conspiracy thinking. But their results also indicate that spite may be a common psychological thread tying these motives together.

Conspiracy theories are widespread and have serious consequences. They can undermine trust in science, foster social division, and hinder collective action on issues like climate change or public health.

“Conspiracy theories have been a long-standing interest of mine, from being a 10-year old watching X-files to observing the explosion of conspiracy theories after 9/11. As a psychologist, I kept up with the latest research and lectured on the subject for years, and from there felt I had found an unexplored area of the topic,” said study author David Gordon, a senior lecturer at the University of Staffordshire.

Past research has identified three main reasons people might turn to conspiracies: the need to understand complex events (epistemic motives), the need to feel safe or in control (existential motives), and the need to feel valued or respected in society (social motives).

But these motives are often studied separately, and the researchers wanted to explore whether they might share a deeper psychological origin. They proposed that feelings of being disadvantaged—whether cognitively, socially, or politically—might activate a spiteful mindset that makes conspiratorial thinking more appealing.

Spite, in this context, is defined as a desire to harm others even if doing so comes at a personal cost. While this behavior seems irrational on the surface, evolutionary theorists argue that spite can sometimes serve a competitive function—lowering the relative advantage of rivals or high-status groups. The researchers hypothesized that conspiracy theories may function as a cultural outlet for this spiteful motivation: by rejecting the authority or expertise of powerful institutions, believers can symbolically “level the playing field.”

In the first two studies, the researchers recruited over 700 participants across two separate samples using the Prolific platform. Participants were representative of the UK population in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity.

They completed several psychological scales designed to measure:

• General belief in conspiracy theories
• Belief in COVID-19 specific conspiracies
• Spite (using the 17-item Spitefulness Scale)
• Intolerance of uncertainty (epistemic motive)
• Political powerlessness (existential motive)
• In-group narcissism and realistic threat (social motives)

The results showed that higher scores on all three motive categories were linked to greater belief in conspiracy theories—and that spite significantly mediated these relationships. In other words, people who felt uncertain, powerless, or socially threatened were more likely to report spiteful attitudes, which in turn predicted higher levels of conspiracy thinking.

The strength of the mediation varied depending on the motive. Spite accounted for a particularly large portion of the relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and belief in conspiracy theories. This suggests that when people feel confused or out of control, spite may offer a psychological outlet—rejecting mainstream explanations or trusted institutions becomes a way of reasserting agency.

The second study replicated the findings of the first, even though a manipulation designed to heighten these motives by exposing participants to threatening post-COVID future scenarios was unsuccessful. Despite this, the correlations and mediation models again supported the idea that spite links these three motives to conspiratorial belief.

To test whether spite could cause conspiratorial thinking, the researchers conducted a third study with 405 individuals where they experimentally induced feelings of spite. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine a scenario in which a character they identified with was socially rejected in favor of a more popular rival. They were then asked to describe how they would “get back” at this person without getting caught.

Those who engaged in the task and wrote a detailed revenge plan scored higher on the spite scale than participants in a control group. However, this increase in spite did not directly lead to significantly higher conspiracy beliefs. Yet, mediation analyses suggested an indirect pathway: the manipulation increased spite, and higher spite was associated with stronger conspiracy thinking. While these results were less robust than the earlier studies, they still provide tentative support for the idea that triggering spite can indirectly influence conspiratorial ideation.

The findings indicate that “the openness to conspiracy theory beliefs is a product of more mundane (but important) concerns, specifically around feeling disadvantaged in different aspects of our life,” Gordon told PsyPost. “It means one should try to have empathy for a friend or family member who is falling down that rabbit hole. It’s also call for those who find themselves automatically rejecting ‘the official line’ to pause and reflect on what exactly it is they’re objecting to and how doing so makes them feel.”

Megan Birney, co-author from the University of Birmingham, added: “We are not suggesting that people consciously choose to be spiteful when believing and spreading conspiracy theories. Instead, our findings suggest that feelings of disadvantage in those three areas can provoke a common psychological – spiteful – response, one that makes individuals more receptive to believing conspiracy theories.”

Although the studies were well-designed and pre-registered, they were not without limitations. Much of the data was cross-sectional, meaning that causal claims should be made cautiously. The experimental manipulation in Study 3, while promising, was not as effective as the researchers had hoped.

“The clearest results in the published work were from the association studies rather than the experimental work, we didn’t demonstrate cause and effect quite as we hoped,” Gordon noted. “And that this is the first piece of evidence for our ‘spitefulness’ hypothesis of conspiracy theory belief rather than final proof.”

In addition, many participants did not fully engage with the task, and the average belief in COVID-19 conspiracies was relatively low across the sample. “The general disbelief in COVID-19 conspiracies was reassuring,” Gordon said. “Conspiracy theorists are certainly very loud, in-person and especially online, but that visibility doesn’t reflect the actual acceptance of those views in the wider public.”

The researchers suggest that future studies could use behavioral economics paradigms—such as competitive games that elicit real spiteful behavior—to test their hypotheses more rigorously. They also propose further work to clarify whether the spitefulness scale captures a temporary state or a stable personality trait.

“As we conclude in the paper, conspiracy theory belief can be seen as a symptom of wider social and economic concerns,” Gordon added. “If we want to tackle the spread of conspiracy theories, and science-denial in general, it’s these wider issues that need to be addressed.”

The study, “Spite and Science-Denial: Exploring the Role of Spitefulness in Conspiracy Ideation and COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs,” was authored by David S. Gordon and Megan E. Birney.