Are sheriffs easing off traffic tickets to sway voters? New study says yes

County sheriffs in California appear to strategically reduce traffic enforcement during election years, according to new research published in the American Journal of Political Science. The study found that counties collected about 9% less in traffic fine revenue during years when sheriffs were up for reelection, with revenues rebounding shortly afterward. The pattern was especially pronounced in highly competitive elections.

While previous research on political cycles has focused on national figures like presidents and governors, or local officials such as mayors and judges, sheriffs have received relatively little attention. This study aimed to fill that gap, exploring how electoral incentives might shape sheriffs’ discretionary enforcement of traffic laws.

“We were intrigued by how sheriff elections—an often overlooked aspect of local politics—might influence law enforcement behavior,” said study author Min Su, an associate professor at Louisiana State University.

“In 46 states, sheriffs are directly elected by voters and hold considerable discretion in setting and enforcing law enforcement policies. Traffic fines, a highly visible and easily manipulated policy tool, offered a good opportunity allowing us to examine whether electoral incentives affect how sheriffs enforce laws.”

“With increasing public scrutiny over governments’ use of fines and fees as a source of revenue, we wanted to understand whether electoral incentives might shape how sheriffs apply traffic enforcement around election time.”

Her co-author, Christian Buerger, an assistant professor at Indiana University, added: “Policing and the growing reliance on fees and fines to support local government budgets have faced increasing criticism. We were interested in whether an important event—such as sheriff elections—influences the collection of local revenues and, ultimately, the provision of policing services.”

The researchers focused on sheriff elections in California, where sheriffs are elected every four years and wield considerable autonomy over law enforcement decisions, including traffic enforcement. The researchers analyzed data from 57 counties across four election cycles, from 2003 to 2020. San Francisco was excluded due to its unique status as a combined city-county government.

The main variable of interest was per capita traffic fines revenue, which serves as a proxy for how actively traffic laws are enforced. The researchers used a panel data approach, controlling for factors like population demographics, political attitudes, fiscal conditions, and road infrastructure. By comparing election years with nonelection years, they sought to detect any consistent changes in traffic enforcement patterns.

The results revealed a clear and temporary drop in traffic fines during election years. On average, counties collected about 35 cents less per person in traffic fines compared to nonelection years. This decline represented a 9% reduction relative to the average of $3.90 in nonelection years. Notably, the decline was short-lived—revenues rebounded the following year.

“Once in office, public officials want to get re-elected,” Buerger explained. “This drive creates a strong incentive to use the resources they oversee to support their re-election. This opportunistic behavior could influence public service delivery.”

To determine whether certain conditions intensified the cycle, the researchers looked at two additional factors: whether the sheriff was an incumbent seeking reelection, and whether the election was competitive. While fines declined more sharply in elections involving incumbents, the difference was not statistically significant. In contrast, the level of competition did make a meaningful difference. In more competitive elections, traffic fine revenues dropped by about 15%, more than twice the decline observed in less competitive races.

“We were surprised by the sharpness and timing of the effect,” Su told PsyPost. “The drop in traffic fines happens only during the election year and rebounds immediately afterward. The cycle is short-lived but pronounced, especially in competitive elections. This suggests that sheriffs respond to voter sentiment quite strategically.”

To test whether the drop in traffic fines could be attributed specifically to sheriffs’ discretionary behavior, the researchers also examined other types of fines, such as court fines and delinquent property taxes, which fall outside the control of sheriff’s offices. These other sources of fine revenue did not show any election-year patterns, strengthening the case that sheriffs were directly influencing traffic enforcement based on electoral incentives.

One feature that makes traffic fines particularly ripe for manipulation is their visibility. A reduction in fines may generate goodwill among voters, especially in communities that are disproportionately affected by traffic stops. Unlike complex policies with delayed outcomes, the impact of relaxed traffic enforcement can be immediate and tangible. Voters may not know the details of a sheriff’s broader policy record, but they are likely to notice if they receive fewer tickets.

“These patterns suggest that sheriffs may intentionally scale back enforcement during election years to avoid upsetting voters,” Su explained. “This behavior points to a larger issue: electoral pressures can subtly influence public safety practices, even when the goal should be neutral enforcement of the law.”

The researchers note that their study is limited to California, and results may differ in other states with different political and institutional structures. However, the pattern they observed is consistent with broader theories of political behavior and opportunism.

They also point out that their analysis focuses on per capita fine revenue, which captures enforcement intensity but not other possible election-related changes, such as shifts in who is targeted or the types of violations enforced.

“The drop in traffic ticket revenues we observe is likely linked to opportunistic behavior by county sheriffs,” Buerger said. “However, we don’t yet know exactly how this plays out. Sheriffs could order fewer stops, issue fewer tickets, or shift officers’ time toward supporting the election campaign. More research is needed to better understand these mechanisms.”

Future research could expand on these findings by examining similar patterns in other jurisdictions or by analyzing additional discretionary tools used by sheriffs and police departments, such as asset forfeitures or arrest rates. Another area of interest is whether reduced enforcement during election years affects public safety outcomes.

“We are interested in exploring whether similar election-related incentives exist in city police departments, not just among sheriffs,” Buerger told PsyPost. “City police chiefs are appointed and do not have full control over policing strategies, so it is unclear whether mayoral elections influence how policing services are delivered. We are also examining whether a reduction in fees, fines, and forfeitures affects service outcomes, such as the number of crimes solved.”

“We’re interested in continuing to explore how financial and political incentives shape local law enforcement behavior,” Su added. “As my coauthor Christian noted, we plan to examine whether electoral incentives influence city police departments as well. We’re also interested in looking at other discretionary policy tools, such as asset forfeitures, and investigating whether changes in law enforcement practices during election years affect the quality of public service delivery—in this case, public safety outcomes.”

The study, “Playing politics with traffic fines: Sheriff elections and political cycles in traffic fines revenue,” was published May 8, 2024.