Democrats dislike Republicans more than Republicans dislike Democrats, studies find

A series of new studies published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology suggests that Democrats in the United States tend to express more dislike toward Republicans than Republicans do toward Democrats. Across five studies and two additional experiments, researchers found this partisan asymmetry was linked to Democrats’ belief that Republicans pose harm to disadvantaged groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities. This perception appears to drive stronger feelings of moral condemnation and social rejection, especially when individuals encounter someone from the opposing party.

Political polarization in the United States has been growing for decades, not just in terms of disagreement over policies but in the form of personal animosity between ordinary Democrats and Republicans. This phenomenon—often referred to as “affective polarization” or “partisan dislike”—has become a defining feature of the American political landscape. People increasingly avoid socializing, marrying, or even living near those who support the opposite party.

Traditionally, political psychologists have argued that conservatives are more likely to show prejudice toward outgroups due to traits like higher threat sensitivity or loyalty to their in-group. However, a more recent theory—the worldview conflict perspective—suggests that both liberals and conservatives are equally hostile toward people who hold conflicting values. In this framework, dislike stems from ideological disagreement rather than party labels alone.

The new research aimed to go beyond these existing theories. The researchers proposed that moralized values might play an asymmetric role in driving partisan dislike. Specifically, the researchers hypothesized that Democrats are more likely to moralize concerns about harm to disadvantaged groups, such as racial minorities or undocumented immigrants. Because Democrats believe Republicans often oppose policies aimed at helping these groups, this moral framing could fuel stronger negative reactions toward Republicans.

“I have a politically diverse social network, and it has been sad seeing friendships break over politics in the past decade. I personally believe that there is much more to someone than who they voted for. This inspired me to better understand why people feel intense dislike and sometimes, outright hatred, against others over their politics,” said lead author Krishnan Nair, a postdoctoral research associate at the Illinois Strategic Organizations Initiative at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.

The researchers conducted a total of five main studies (along with two supplemental ones) between 2022 and 2023 to investigate partisan dislike and its underlying causes. These studies used a mix of field experiments on social media and controlled survey-based experiments to capture both real-world behaviors and psychological mechanisms.

The first study took place on Twitter and involved over 4,000 users. The researchers created multiple research accounts that were designed to appear as real users. These accounts had unique names, profile pictures, and interests. Half of the accounts were designed to appear liberal (Democratic-leaning), and half conservative (Republican-leaning). These research accounts followed Twitter users who had been identified as Democrats or Republicans based on their online behavior.

The researchers then observed how users responded to being followed by a counter-partisan account—that is, a liberal user being followed by a conservative account or vice versa. They specifically measured whether the user followed the account back (a signal of positive engagement) or blocked the account (a signal of rejection).

The results showed that Democrats were more likely to block a counter-partisan follower than Republicans were. There was no significant partisan difference in following the account back. This behavioral pattern indicated that Democrats expressed stronger aversion to being socially connected with people from the opposing party, even in a low-stakes, anonymous context.

In their second study, Nair and his colleagues recruited participants online (284 Democrats and 288 Republicans) and randomly assigned them to consider a hypothetical neighbor who either shared or did not share their political affiliation. Participants were then asked how much they would like this neighbor and how likely they thought the neighbor would be to harm disadvantaged people, such as racial or ethnic minorities.

Democrats evaluated Republican neighbors more negatively than Republicans evaluated Democratic neighbors. Crucially, Democrats were also more likely to believe that their counter-partisan neighbor would cause harm to disadvantaged people. This belief partially explained their negative evaluations, suggesting that Democrats’ dislike was not based solely on political difference but was tied to a perceived moral threat.

The third study involved 400 employed adults—split evenly between self-identified Democrats and Republicans—who were asked to evaluate a hypothetical job applicant. The applicant’s resume included subtle political cues, such as their involvement with either the Young Democrats or Young Republicans and their campaign work for either Joe Biden or Donald Trump. These cues helped establish whether the applicant was a copartisan or counter-partisan relative to the participant.

Participants rated the applicant’s suitability for a workplace position and answered questions about how likely they believed the applicant would be to harm various groups: disadvantaged coworkers, people like themselves, and the organization as a whole. They also reported how morally wrong they believed it was to hold certain political views typically associated with the opposing party—such as minimizing racism or opposing immigration.

Democrats rated Republican applicants as less suitable for the job than Republicans rated Democratic applicants. This asymmetry in hiring evaluation was driven in part by Democrats’ belief that Republican applicants were more likely to harm disadvantaged employees. These beliefs did not extend to concerns about personal harm or organizational harm, highlighting the specificity of the perceived moral threat.

Moreover, Democrats expressed stronger moral condemnation of opposing views on racism and immigration, but not on transgender rights or general party affiliation. This pattern suggests that certain values—particularly those involving race and immigration—are more heavily moralized among Democrats, which helps explain why these issues uniquely fuel partisan dislike.

In their fourth study, the researchers tested the causal relationship between value alignment and partisan dislike by using a more controlled experiment. The researchers presented 797 participants with a scenario involving a branch manager at a bank who allocated funds to different task forces, including one focused on diversity and inclusion. Participants were told that the manager was a counter-partisan—Democrats saw a Republican manager, and Republicans saw a Democratic one.

The researchers manipulated whether the manager allocated a high or low percentage of funds to the diversity task force. Participants then rated how much they liked the manager and how likely they believed the manager was to harm disadvantaged people.

The results showed that when the counter-partisan manager supported diversity efforts, Democrats liked them just as much as Republicans did. But when the manager did not support those initiatives, Democrats rated them less favorably than Republicans did. In other words, the asymmetry in partisan dislike disappeared when the counter-partisan aligned with the Democrat’s values regarding support for disadvantaged people. This study provided causal evidence that perceived harm to disadvantaged groups plays a key role in Democrats’ stronger partisan dislike.

To replicate the findings in a naturalistic setting, Nair and his colleagues conducted a second Twitter experiment involving 6,000 users. Similar to Study 1, research accounts followed users from the opposing political party. This time, however, the accounts also signaled either support or opposition to disadvantaged groups. For example, some profiles included slogans like “Black Lives Matter” and statements recognizing racism as a major problem, while others explicitly rejected these views.

Democrat users were more likely to block counter-partisan accounts that did not support disadvantaged groups. When the account expressed support for these groups, the rate of blocking dropped noticeably among Democrats, and the difference between Democrats and Republicans narrowed.

This pattern did not appear when looking at follow-back behavior, suggesting that blocking—an active form of social rejection—was a more telling measure of partisan dislike. The findings from this field experiment mirrored those in the survey experiment, reinforcing the idea that perceived moral harm to disadvantaged groups drives asymmetric dislike.

“Various studies have found that Democrats and Republicans in the general population display hostility and animosity against each other. This can cause political segregation, leading to the formation of “red” versus “blue” neighborhoods, businesses, and social media networks,” Nair told PsyPost.

“We find that in the present day, Democrats display greater hostility against Republicans than vice versa across a number of domains, including social media behavior, neighbor relations, and hiring decisions. This tendency is fueled by the belief among Democrats that Republicans pose harm to disadvantaged people, particularly ethnic and racial minorities.”

“At the same time, other research conducted by myself and others suggest that Democrats and Republicans don’t actually differ all that much in how much they discriminate against racial minorities. Since similar hypocrisy can also be found on the political right, this suggests, at least to me, that both Democrats and Republicans should look in the mirror before casting negative judgments at fellow citizens over their politics. After all, the average citizen has relatively little influence over what happens at the top.”

Two additional studies, reported in the supplemental materials, further supported the main findings. These studies used similar survey designs to test perceptions of harm and moral condemnation. They confirmed that Democrats were more likely to associate Republicans with harm to disadvantaged people and to morally condemn opposing views on race and immigration. These beliefs were again linked to stronger negative reactions toward counter-partisan individuals.

“The consistency of the pattern surprised me,” Nair said. “Not just greater political hostility among Democrats in the present day, but also how important of a factor that concern for harm to disadvantaged people has become in how Democrats view Republicans.”

While the findings offer a compelling explanation for asymmetric partisan dislike, the study has some limitations. First, all data were collected in the United States during a specific period, shaped by recent political events such as the presidency of Donald Trump and the protests following the death of George Floyd. These events may have heightened moral concern about racial injustice among Democrats, making the results time-sensitive.

“Our findings shouldn’t be taken to mean that Democrats are inherently more prejudicial against Republicans than Republicans are against Democrats,” Nair explained. “Our findings are from a snapshot in time, and in the future, we may have periods where Republicans display greater hostility against Democrats or the two sides are fairly symmetric in their hostility.”

The researchers also focused primarily on interpersonal attitudes and behaviors, such as hiring decisions and online interactions. It’s possible that other forms of political hostility may show different patterns. Future studies could explore whether similar moralization patterns exist in non-partisan contexts or among other social groups beyond political parties.

Looking forward, Nair wants “to examine potential interventions that can reduce political hostility. I also want to do more work examining how the actual and perceived social and political views of applicants influence who businesses are likely to hire.”

The study, “Asymmetric Polarization: The Perception That Republicans Pose Harm to Disadvantaged Groups Drives Democrats’ Greater Dislike of Republicans in Social Contexts,” was authored by Krishnan Nair, Rajen A. Anderson, Trevor Spelman, Mohsen Mosleh, and Maryam Kouchaki.