A new study published in Political Psychology suggests that citizens’ populist attitudes are not fixed traits but instead shift over time, with changes often linked to how people view the performance of their country’s democracy. The findings imply that populist beliefs may act as a kind of “thermometer,” reflecting perceived democratic quality rather than remaining stable regardless of political conditions.
Marie-Isabel Theuwis, a postdoctoral researcher at the Université libre de Bruxelles, set out to better understand whether populist attitudes can actually change, and if so, what drives those changes.
Populism is a political approach that frames society as divided into two opposing groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” It argues that politics should directly reflect the will of the people, often rejecting established representative institutions and compromises. Populist rhetoric can come from across the political spectrum, with leaders or movements portraying themselves as the true voice of ordinary citizens against an untrustworthy establishment.
Many political scientists view populism among citizens as a challenge for liberal democracies because it rejects representative decision-making in favor of direct control by “the people.” Some have proposed reforms to make political systems more inclusive and responsive in hopes of reducing populist discontent. But until now, it has been unclear whether such reforms could realistically influence citizens’ beliefs—or whether those beliefs are essentially locked in.
“Populism amongst citizens usually goes hand in hand with a sense of democratic dissatisfaction,” Theuwis explained. “I therefore study how changes in our democratic system affect our populist sentiments. A crucial piece in this research puzzle is to understand whether our populist attitudes are even changeable over time or if they represent a stable political disposition, and, if they do change, to explore why they would change.”
For her study, Theuwis analyzed two large panel datasets that tracked the same individuals over nearly four years: one from the Netherlands, which included 16 survey waves between 2020 and 2023, and one from Great Britain, which included six waves between 2016 and 2020. Both countries regularly measured populist attitudes using the same survey items, allowing for cross-national comparisons. The two political systems differ sharply—Britain’s is a majoritarian system dominated by a few parties, while the Netherlands has a highly proportional system with many parties—offering a chance to see if populist beliefs behave differently under these conditions.
The study measured populist attitudes with questions assessing agreement with statements such as “The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people” and “What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.” Responses were averaged to produce a score from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).
In addition to tracking these scores over time, Theuwis also measured variables that could influence them. These included satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction with the economy, and whether the respondent’s preferred party was in government—all indicators of perceived political performance. She also used indirect measures of “receptiveness to populist cues,” such as liking for a populist political leader and attachment to a populist party.
The statistical approach relied on latent growth curve models, which make it possible to assess how attitudes change within individuals over time and how those changes align with shifts in other variables. By comparing results to benchmark attitudes—political ideology, which is typically stable, and government satisfaction, which tends to fluctuate—Theuwis could determine where populist attitudes fall on the stability spectrum.
The results showed that populist attitudes are neither highly stable nor wildly volatile. In both Britain and the Netherlands, they changed more than political ideology but less than satisfaction with the government. The best-fitting statistical models indicated that changes were not gradual and linear but fluctuated over time, suggesting that shifts can occur in response to particular events or circumstances.
“Much like the temperature, our populist attitudes fluctuate over time,” Theuwis told PsyPost. “Changes in our satisfaction with democracy are associated with changes in our populist attitudes. This means that we should keep on trying to improve our democracies, since populist attitudes seem receptive to changes in the political system’s performance.”
When it came to what drives these shifts, patterns varied by country. In the Netherlands, changes in populist attitudes were consistently tied to changes in how people rated their democracy and, to a lesser extent, the economy. When satisfaction with democratic functioning or economic conditions improved, populist attitudes tended to decrease.
In Britain, democratic satisfaction also predicted changes in populist attitudes, but there was an added effect from supply-side influences. People who grew more attached to populist parties or expressed warmer feelings toward populist politicians were more likely to see their populist attitudes rise in subsequent surveys.
This difference may reflect the political contexts of each country. Britain’s majoritarian system and the high-profile Brexit campaign may have amplified the ability of populist leaders and parties to shape citizens’ views. In the Netherlands, with its multiparty system, shifts in political performance evaluations may play a larger role.
Overall, the study’s most consistent finding across both countries was that changes in democratic satisfaction were linked to changes in populist attitudes. This supports the idea that citizens’ populist beliefs partly reflect their evaluations of how well their democracy is functioning, rather than being fixed personality-driven worldviews.
Theuwis notes that the findings have implications for efforts to address populist discontent. If populist attitudes respond to perceived improvements in democratic quality, reforms that make political systems more inclusive, responsive, and representative could reduce the appeal of populist messages. At the same time, the study highlights the need to better understand the interplay between citizens’ beliefs and political events, as the relationship may work both ways—dissatisfaction can drive populism, but populist sentiment might also deepen democratic discontent.
The research does have limitations. It relied on proxy measures for exposure to populist cues, which may underestimate their influence, and it focused on just two countries. The time gaps between survey waves also mean it may have missed shorter-term shifts.
“I study the average change: not everybody’s populist attitudes behave the same. For some citizens, their populist attitudes remain stable, while for others, they change a lot over time.
I explored only some of many possible drivers of populist attitudes change. These other drivers are still left to explore.”
Future studies could track attitudes at more frequent intervals, test other potential drivers such as perceptions of corruption or social inequality, and explore whether populist attitudes change differently in countries where populist parties move in and out of government.
“In a study linked to this research (Theuwis & Kindt, 2024), with my colleague Rosa Kindt we assess whether processes that involve citizens more in democratic decision-making actually affect their populist attitudes,” Theuwis added. “We find that highly populist citizens become less populist after participation in such a participatory process. Then, in another study (Theuwis, 2025), I explore why such processes affect our populist attitudes, and what this means for how we should improve our democratic systems. I find that highly populist citizens pay special attention to whether authorities take citizens seriously. They want the political process to be inclusive and for citizens to have a visible impact on policy-making.”
The study, “Taking democracy’s temperature: The (in)stability and covariates of populist attitudes,” was published July 4, 2025.
