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Public opinion toward major technology corporations does not fall neatly along a simple spectrum from support to opposition, according to new research published in Research and Politics. Analyzing survey data from six countries, researchers found that higher levels of education are linked to mixed, conflicted views rather than outright enthusiasm for large tech firms. The study also indicates that political ideology is linked to these attitudes in distinct ways, with left-leaning individuals more likely to be skeptical and highly educated right-leaning individuals increasingly likely to hold ambivalent views.
Big Tech refers to the largest and most dominant companies in the information technology industry, specifically global corporations such as Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft. Beyond selling consumer products and digital services, these firms control the core infrastructure of modern communication, commerce, and emerging tools like artificial intelligence. Because their platforms influence how citizens find information, participate in public debates, and interact with democratic institutions, governments face growing questions about whether to regulate these companies more strictly or support their continued growth.
Political scientists have spent considerable effort examining how technological shifts affect workers and voters, though less attention has gone toward how the public evaluates the specific corporations driving those changes. For example, a 2022 review noted that workplace automation and digitalization tend to divide the workforce into economic winners who favor the political status quo and routine workers who face job risks and gravitate toward populist politics. Similarly, a study covered by PsyPost in 2022 found that workers facing higher exposure to job automation were more likely to support radical-right parties and report lower satisfaction with democracy.
When turning from workplace technology to the specific corporations behind it, Tobias Tober and colleagues at the University of Konstanz expected education and political ideology to guide public attitudes. In modern knowledge economies, which rely heavily on information and technical expertise rather than manual labor, university-educated individuals usually enjoy stronger job prospects and greater familiarity with digital tools. Prior work, including a 2024 cross-country survey, conducted in part by two of the same researchers, linked how much job risk people perceive from digitalization to how they want governments to respond. Based on these patterns, the authors initially expected highly educated people to view Big Tech companies positively.
Ideology was also expected to play a central role, though in different ways across the political spectrum. Individuals on the political left generally distrust corporate monopolies, wealth inequality, and unchecked private power, which suggests they would view tech giants critically. On the political right, expectations are more complicated because traditional pro-business values favor large corporations, whereas right-wing populist movements often distrust the cultural and social shifts tied to digital capitalism.
To test how these factors work in practice, the researchers commissioned the survey firm Kantar Public to collect data in June and July 2022 across six countries: Germany, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. The sample included 3,300 adults aged 18 to 64 in each country, totaling 19,800 respondents. The researchers used quota sampling for age, gender, and education so that the participants reflected the broader national populations of their respective countries.
Participants rated their agreement on a five-point scale with six statements about the societal role of global technology companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. Three statements reflected positive contributions: providing useful services to the public, promoting innovation and economic development, and aiding democracy by offering a digital space for open debate. The other three statements captured negative impacts: undermining the national welfare state by avoiding taxes, weakening labor standards, and becoming so powerful that they threaten democracy.
The researchers then used exploratory factor analysis, a statistical technique that groups related survey answers together to uncover underlying patterns in how people think. Rather than finding a single scale where positive views sit at one end and negative views sit at the other, the analysis pointed to two separate dimensions that barely correlated with each other. Agreeing with positive statements about Big Tech had almost no bearing on whether a person disagreed with negative statements.
Next, the authors applied a grouping method called k-means cluster analysis to see how respondents combined these positive and negative evaluations. The researchers sorted the 19,800 participants into five profiles. The largest group was the neutral cluster (8,140 respondents), consisting of people who neither agreed nor disagreed with most statements, followed by the ambivalent cluster (5,114 respondents), who agreed with both positive and negative statements at the same time.
The remaining participants fell into three smaller categories. Big Tech supporters (3,739 respondents) agreed with the positive statements and rejected the negative ones, while skeptics (2,123 respondents) endorsed the negative statements and rejected the positive ones. Finally, a small dismissive group (685 respondents) disagreed with both positive and negative characterizations of the industry.
To see how education and ideology predicted membership in these five groups, the team ran statistical models that accounted for income and differences between countries, and the results held when they also accounted for technology use at home and at work. Education was divided into three levels based on international standards, ranging from lower secondary schooling up to university degrees. Political ideology was measured on an 11-point scale where respondents placed themselves from far left to far right.
Contrary to the researchers’ initial expectations, higher education was not linked to a large jump in outright support for Big Tech. Moving from the lowest to the highest education level increased the predicted probability of being a supporter by only about 3 percentage points, and the probability of being a skeptic by about 2 percentage points. Instead, the probability of belonging to the ambivalent group rose from 22 percent among less educated respondents to 33 percent among university-educated respondents, while the likelihood of being neutral dropped from 43 percent to 30 percent.
Political ideology also separated respondents in distinct ways, with people in the political center most likely to belong to the neutral group. Moving from the center to the far left increased the predicted probability of being a skeptic by about 10 percentage points. Moving from the center to the far right increased the probability of skepticism by about 6 percentage points, while raising the probability of belonging to the ambivalent group by roughly 10 percentage points. These patterns were broadly similar across the six countries, though with some differences.
When the researchers looked at how education and ideology interacted, they found that ideological divisions were sharpest among university-educated citizens, with declining neutrality on the left translating mainly into higher skepticism. On the right, the pattern ran counter to the researchers’ expectations: there was some evidence that support declined toward the far right among the highly educated, while the probability of holding ambivalent views rose by about 16 percentage points from the political center to the far right. The authors suggest this may reflect a conflict between pro-market beliefs and conservative concerns over how tech platforms influence culture and speech.
The authors also examined whether these five attitude groups aligned with policy preferences regarding government regulation and state financial or political backing for tech firms. Across the full sample, 38 percent of respondents favored stronger regulation of Big Tech, 20 percent opposed it, and 42 percent were undecided. Similarly, 32 percent favored giving the companies more economic and political support, 19 percent opposed doing so, and 49 percent remained undecided.
Breaking these numbers down by group showed that attitude profiles closely tracked policy demands. Skeptics overwhelmingly backed stricter regulation at 82 percent and opposed government support for the industry at 65 percent, while supporters showed little appetite for regulation (23 percent in favor) and leaned toward government backing (40 percent in favor). Ambivalent respondents tended to want both interventions simultaneously, with 72 percent favoring more regulation and 46 percent favoring more government support.
These patterns align with research covered by PsyPost earlier this year, which examined public beliefs regarding the economic and labor impacts of artificial intelligence rather than evaluations of Big Tech companies, and similarly found that political ideology structures technology-related attitudes and regulatory preferences. The heightened skepticism on the left is also broadly in line with a 2023 study covered by PsyPost, which analyzed sentiment in news coverage of artificial intelligence rather than public survey attitudes toward major tech corporations and found that liberal-leaning media outlets expressed more negative sentiment toward artificial intelligence than conservative outlets.
To explain why higher education is linked to ambivalence rather than simple support, the authors propose an explanation drawn from a classic theory of how people form political opinions. In this view, education serves as a rough indicator of political awareness, so highly educated people may encounter more competing arguments about both the benefits and dangers of digital platforms. Rather than settling on a one-sided view, they may absorb both sets of arguments, or experience a clash between their economic preferences and cultural values, though the authors note their account remains incomplete.
As with all research, there are some caveats to consider. Because the study relies on survey responses collected at a single point in time in 2022, it cannot establish cause-and-effect relationships or track how attitudes might have shifted following recent breakthroughs in generative artificial intelligence. The survey also included only adults aged 18 to 64 and used quota sampling rather than random sampling, so the results may not fully represent older adults or each country’s population as a whole. In addition, educational attainment overlaps with several other characteristics, such as income and digital literacy, making it difficult to isolate the exact reason why university graduates express more mixed views.
The researchers also note that their analysis treats political messages as broadly similar across the six surveyed nations. In reality, political parties and news media frame technology debates differently across the United States, Japan, and Europe, which could create local variations that broad cross-national models only partly capture. Future studies could track how these public attitudes evolve over time in response to shifting political rhetoric and new regulatory laws.
The study, “Big Tech, big risk? How education and ideology shape public attitudes toward Big Tech companies,” was authored by Tobias Tober, Marius R. Busemeyer, and Sebastian Koos.